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Objectives: The headroom approach to medical device development relies on the estimation of a value-based price ceiling at different stages of the development cycle. Such
price-ceilings delineate the commercial opportunities for new products in many healthcare systems. We apply a simple model to obtain critical business information as the product
proceeds along a development pathway, and indicate some future directions for the development of the approach.
Methods: Health economic modelling in the supply-side development cycle for new products.
Results: The headroom can be used: initially as a ‘reality check’ on the viability of the device in the healthcare market; to support product development decisions using a real options
approach; and to contribute to a pricing policy which respects uncertainties in the reimbursement outlook.
Conclusions: The headroom provides a unifying thread for business decisions along the development cycle for a new product. Over the course of the cycle attitudes to uncertainty will
evolve, based on the timing and manner in which new information accrues. Within this framework the developmental value of new information can justify the costs of clinical trials
and other evidence-gathering activities. Headroom can function as a simple shared tool to parties in commercial negotiations around individual products or groups of products. The
development of similar approaches in other contexts holds promise for more rational planning of service provision.
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The market for medical devices is distinctively different from
those in other sectors. Epidemiological studies can provide un-
usually precise figures for the limits of demand, and there is
an economic framework to value health benefits in many parts
of the developed world (1;2). Increasingly, additional service
costs are weighed against health gains, measured, for instance,
in quality-adjusted life-years (QALYs) using a declared (or im-
plied) monetary equivalent for each unit of health benefit. By
integrating this information into business reviews, companies
can avoid under-pricing products or prematurely rejecting prod-
ucts that lie above the value-for-money threshold.
Manufacturers need a simple approach to make rapid de-
cisions at the start of product development, but one that can
be elaborated for later business reviews. The “Headroom” ap-
proach provides a thread that can connect analysis at different
stages, providing deterministic rules of thumb early on, prob-
abilistic analyses during the development phases and pricing
guidelines in preparation for launching the product. The focus
on economic evaluation from a company’s perspective (3;4)may
be termed “supply-side health economics.”
The authors acknowledge support of this work through the MATCH program (EPSRC Grant
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This study draws together what is known about such meth-
ods and considers how the method may be consistently de-
veloped in future, by presenting a series of simple examples,
chosen for their explanatory properties. The National Institute
for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) operates an explicit val-
uation framework for the NHS in England, which is used here,
although the approach applies more generally. Discounting is
usually applied (currently 3.5 percent for NICE) to calculate the
present value of future health and cost implications of a med-
ical intervention, and in business practice to discount future
cash-flows for project valuation. However, discounting does not
affect the principles presented here, so it has been ignored in
the interests of clarity.
Headroom Approach
The framework operated by NICE in England balances the
health and social care cost (HSCC) of a medical intervention
against health benefits, measured in QALYs. When a new treat-
ment displaces an existing treatment, the net-benefit is:
(Reduction in HSCC from new treatment)
+ λ × (Additional QALYs generated)
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Figure 1. Schematic for a development review of a new device.
where λ is the threshold for the incremental cost-effectiveness
ratio (ICER) which usually lies in the range 20,000 to 30,000
GBP (5). In theory, NICE will recommend any treatment with a
positive net benefit but such approval is easier (and quicker) to
obtain if it is also cost-saving (5;6)—that is, if HSCC is reduced
with no reduction in QALYs—which would entail a value for λ
of zero.
In this study, the term “(commercial) headroom” for a new
device is the net benefit that would be recognized by the health-
care provider if the device were supplied free of charge to the
health service.
H = (Net reduction in HSCC ignoring the price of the device)
+ λ × (Additional QALYs generated) .
The Headroom, H, is the most the manufacturer could charge
while securing funding from the care provider—the maximum
reimbursable price (MRP)—and sets a ceiling on the unit cost
of the new device, including production and development costs.
It relies on the same principles as a full economic analysis of
a medical intervention but will often be estimated early in the
device’s development, when data are limited, and so will tend
to focus on the more obvious benefits of the relevant therapeu-
tic pathway. This simplification ignores some effects but may
provide a useful reality check for the ultimate success of the
product.
The idea of headroom analysis was introduced by Sculpher
and others (7), using the term “effectiveness gap.” Some exam-
ples have been published (8;9), including an iterated approach
applied retrospectively across a completed development cycle
(10), showing that useful headroom estimates can be obtained
even when there is little or no empirical evidence—which is
often the case at the outset of development.
Example: Stapled Hemorrhoidectomy
Stapled hemorrhoidectomy (SH) was introduced into the UK in
1998, and is now recommended for treating 3rd and 4th degree
hemorrhoids (11). Chapman et al. (12) conducted a retrospective
headroom analysis using information available only up to 1995.
SHwas proposed as a day-case procedure, so its principal benefit
over the standard (Milligan-Morgan) technique was a shorter
hospital stay (an estimated saving of 2 days, at 300 GBP/day,
in 90 percent of cases), while it was anticipated that SH would
accelerate healing and reduce pain (estimated utility-gain of
0.24 for 2 weeks, or 0.24 × 2 ÷ 52 = 0.009 QALYs).
At a 20,000 GBP cost-per-QALY threshold, the resulting
headroom estimate is
H = (2 × 300 × 0.9) + 20,000 × 0.009 = 720 GBP.
While subject to considerable uncertainty, most (540 GBP)
of this headroom derives from a simple cost analysis. By 2007,
the stapling device was selling at 420 GBP and recommended
by NICE.
Initial development decisions are taken under conditions of
greatest uncertainty but they entail the least financial commit-
ment because they can be reversed before significant costs are
incurred. Thus, an early decision to abandon a promising idea
should not be taken lightly. This supports the recommendation
that early stage headroom calculations should adopt “optimistic
assumptions in the plausible range.” (8)
By market launch, however, businesses need realistic pro-
jections of costs and revenues, so a headroom analysis con-
ducted late in the development cycle should adopt the perspec-
tive of a hard-nosed purchaser. Headroom estimates are most
useful when regularly reviewed (13) and can also inform the
pricing strategy or lead to termination of development.
Development Decisions
Business (or stage-gate) reviews focus on a product’s ultimate
profitability, and aim to terminate the development where the
case cannot be made. At any review (Figure 1), certain costs
will have already been committed (sunk costs), so the review
must focus on whether the projected market revenues (net of
production costs) will cover further development costs (D).
Market revenues will often be calculated over a restricted
time horizon—perhaps 1 or 2 years—consistent with company
policy. Then a simple expression for the value (V) of the rev-
enues, net of production costs, is given by:
V = M × (H −U )
INTL. J. OF TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT IN HEALTH CARE 31:5, 2015 2
Headroom approach to device development
Table 1. Economic Models for an Implantable Device Incorporating Uncertainty
Models for resolvable uncertainty
Parameter Estimate (Range) Model A Model B Model C
Extra healthcare costs (per patient) £3,000 (± £1,000) point estimate (£3,000) point estimate (£3,000) Gaussian: mean £3,000;
SD = £500
QALY gain (per patient) 0.25 (± 0.25) 0 or 0.5, (2-point
distribution)
Gaussian: mean 0.25; SD
= 0.125.
Gaussian: mean 0.25; SD
= 0.125.






Production Costs (U) (per unit) £5,000 assumed known assumed known assumed known
Adjusted sales projection, year 1 (M) 200 (± 200) point estimate (200) point estimate (200) point estimate (200)
where M = the projected number of items sold over the 1-
or 2-year horizon, H = Headroom estimate of the Maximum
Reimbursable Price, and U = Estimated cost of production per
unit.
However, unless the healthcare provider operates a strict
value-based pricing regime (14) it is unlikely that vendors will
achieve the full MRP, so it has been argued (15) that some
scaling back of sales (reducingM by approximately 20 percent)
is appropriate, while leaving the rest of the analysis intact.
Even if V is negative, uncertainty surrounding the head-
room estimate may provide hope of success and a probabilistic
approach is warranted when the uncertainty is wide enough to
affect the development decision.
Development Decisions and Uncertainty
Because some design or target performance parameters may
be resolved given time and investment, the decision to con-
tinue development can be revisited. This insight is the basis
of the “real options” approach to business investment (16;17),
which recognizes that uncertainty tends to narrow as time
goes by, allowing better decisions to be made later and mak-
ing it less likely that a worthwhile project will be abandoned
prematurely.
Example: Implantable Heart Device
Imagine that a new type of implantable device is proposed for
patients with heart failure. The additional healthcare costs are
estimated at 3,000 GBP. There are no primary clinical studies
in man, and expert opinion is divided on its likely effectiveness.
Opinion ranges from those who anticipate a possible average
survival gain of approximately 0.5QALYs, to those who fear
that the net effect on patients will be negligible. Production
costs are estimated at 5,000 GBP per unit.
The situation is summarized in Table 1. We consider three
alternative models. Under Model A, we assume that there are
two sets of equally credible experts representing opposite ex-
tremes of opinion. Depending on which experts you believe,
the headroom estimate ranges from minus 3,000 GBP (assum-
ing no health effects) to 0.5 × 30,000 minus 3,000 = 12,000
GBP, based on a Cost-per-QALY threshold of 30,000 GBP. In
this case, the best estimate of H is the average (−3,000 +
12,000)/2 = 4,500 GBP), which will not cover production costs
and suggests abandoning development.
However, suppose that development is allowed to proceed
until the device can be tested in a clinical trial (see Figure 2).
If the pessimists are proved right, development can be termi-
nated before production costs are incurred and postmarket net
revenues will be zero. But if the optimists are right and pa-
tient survival really is enhanced, the (estimated) net value of
postmarket revenues is
M × (12,000 − 5,000) = M × 7,000 GBP.
If, at the outset, the experts are equally credible, the best estimate
of revenues taking account of the value of the deferred decision,





+ 7,000 × 1
2
)
= M × 3,500 GBP
Depending on the market-size, M, this may be enough to cover
the development costs which, in this example, will include the
costs of running the trial.
The impact of a putative clinical trial should be evaluated
when making decisions earlier in the development cycle. The
same is true for other “developmental uncertainties” (18). For
example, there may be initial uncertainty about the cost of
production for a new device, which, one anticipates, will be
known more accurately by the time a final marketing decision is
made. This flexibility is the fundamental justification for using
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Figure 2. The value of a deferred decision under Model A. The decision to proceed to market will be taken only after the result of the trial is known. The initial estimate of net market-revenues—used to inform the
development decision—should take account of the outcome of the later decision and is based only on the outer branches of the decision tree in this example. Assuming equal chances for the two possible trial results this
value is½× 7,000 +½× 0 = 3,500 GBP per item.
Table 2. Uncertainties in the Development Cycle
Resolvable 1. Functionality Technological/design
2. Production costs Design/labor/materials/capital
3. Health service issues Service costs/treatment pathways
4. Treatment effectiveness Comparator treatment/health
benefit
5. Competition Other new products
Irresolvable 6. Market penetration Marketing/service policy/local
purchasing
optimistic estimates in an early-stage deterministic headroom
analysis (8). It is important to emphasize that optimistic es-
timates are a substitute for the probabilistic approaches con-
sidered here, which should be based on the best estimates
available.
Where there is no realistic possibility of resolving uncer-
tainty later in the cycle, there can be no intrinsic value in de-
ferring the decision. This might be because an unfeasibly large
study would be required, or because the uncertainty is a function
of unknown future market behavior such as the emergence of
an alternative treatment (“postmarket uncertainty”).
Table 2 lists some significant parameters according to how
susceptible they are to resolution during the product develop-
ment cycle. Thus, questions of design, functionality, and pro-
duction costs become clearer once the design is settled. How-
ever, market penetration will require knowledge that can only
be obtained by going to market. The costs of reaching the mar-
ket decision gate—the Development Costs, D, in Figure 1—
belong to a special category because they will be fully com-
mitted before the time of the market-gate review. Best esti-
mates of these costs should therefore be used (perhaps with
a sensitivity/scenario analysis) when taking the development
decision.
Value of Resolvable Uncertainty
As information about H and U accrues, the projected revenue
per unit (= H – U) will be revised, either upward or downward.
In the example above, it was suggested that only two outcomes
are possible (Table 1, Model A); in practice, it may be more
realistic to model future changes in projected revenue using
an error distribution as in Model B. The standard deviation
(SD), σ , of the distribution reflects the amount of uncertainty
which will be eliminated. This translates into extra project value








In this expression,Mσ is the standard deviation of the possi-
ble future changes in projected revenue and T(.) is a mathemati-
cal function, illustrated in Supplementary Figure 1. for the case
of aNormal (Gaussian) error distribution. It is clear from the fig-
ure the extra value is greatest whenH=U, and negligible when
(H – U) is more than 2σ from zero. The extra value is applied to
the project after first working out how much the product would
be worth if the marketing decision were made immediately. For
the implantable device (Table 1) this “immediate” value is actu-
ally zero because the estimate ofH (4,500 GBP per item) would
not justify market launch in the face of estimated production
costs of U = 5,000 GBP.
Under Model B (Table 1) expert opinion is described by a
bell-shaped Normal curve centered on 0.25 QALYs with SD
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0.125. At 30,000 GBP per QALY, this translates into a SD of
σ = 3,750 GBP for the headroom H. So the extra value (per












= 3,750 × T (−0.133)
= 3,750 × 0.336 = 1,260 GBP.
On applying this extra value (multiplied by the first-year sales
projection of 200 devices), development should continue pro-
vided that D, the development cost projection, does not ex-
ceed 200 × 1,260 = 252,000 GBP. A further refinement of the
approach allows for resolvable uncertainty in healthcare costs
(Model C). However, an approximate analysis of this scenario
shows a further increase in value of around 1 percent only, and
so is ignored here.
In practice, it is unlikely that the health benefit will be fully
quantified before the marketing decision is taken and some
uncertainty will remain even after a trial, depending on the
design and sample-size (19). Thus it may be over-optimistic to
identify σ—the SD of the resolvable uncertainty—with the SD
of the value of the QALY-gain. A better approach is to set
σ =
√
SD2 − σ 2F
where σ F is the SD of the QALY-gain that is expected to apply
when the trial is complete—a quantity routinely computed for
sample size calculations, although usually without taking ac-
count of information available before the trial. For example, a
trial powered to eliminate half the uncertainty ( σ 2F = SD2/2 )
would have σ = SD/2 and lead, in this example, to an extra
value of approximately 830 GBP per item. This is (necessarily)
smaller than the earlier figure of 1,260 GBP as calculated above
for a comprehensive trial.
Headroom and Pricing
Manufacturers must calculate H just before market-entry, but
there is no guarantee that a price set at, or even just below,
H, will ensure that the healthcare provider buys the product.
Thus the headroom estimate is, at best, a prediction for the
MRP.
As well as maximizing the chance of reimbursement, price-
setting must ensure that the unit costs of production are met and
should seek to maximize revenues. This motivates the formu-
lation of price-setting as a formal optimization problem (15),
balancing the risk that reimbursement is withheld against the
large revenues that accrue when a high price is accepted by the
provider. The optimal price will usually lie between U, the unit
cost of production, and the headroom estimate, H, and a lower
bound on the optimal price has been identified (= 0.23 × U
+ 0.77 × H). This is valid under normally distributed predic-
tion errors and underpins a pragmatic approach to price-setting,
where a price of 0.16 × U + 0.84 × H emerges as close to
optimal in many circumstances (15). Even then, there is some
chance that reimbursement might be withheld. This chance can
be estimated as approximately 5 percent if the prediction stan-
dard deviation is 10 percent of the difference between H and U,
leading to a revenue estimate of
0.80 × (H − U) per item
This convenient rule of thumb may also be used at earlier stages
of the cycle whenever postmarket revenue projections are re-
quired.
The estimate may be further reduced by competition or the
presence of lower cost devices on the market. For example,
one study (10) found an impressive headroom for the use of
bio-absorbable pins in the treatment of hallux valgus; yet the
simplicity of the device, and the existence of similar low-priced
products for other conditions, effectively ruled out the higher
price.
Where Do We Go Next?
Despite the usefulness of the headroom approach it would be
idle to pretend that the outlook for a medical product can be
reduced to tracking the fortunes of a single numerical quantity
as it develops over time. For supply-side decision making, there
are important additional criteria including the impact of the
new product on the company’s product-portfolio and a whole
range of competitive issues concerning the positioning of the
company in the market place. Nevertheless, at any given time
in the development process, a headroom analysis can provide a
relatively simple way of maintaining contact with the economic
realities of the healthcare market. The situation is not dissimi-
lar to the use of utility-measures by healthcare providers: they
do not tell the full story and may need to be supplemented
by further equity considerations, but they do provide a frame-
work on which the edifice of technology evaluation can be
built.
We now suggest some themes for further development of
the approach.
Practical Commercial Value of the Headroom Method
A validation of assessment methods for new product develop-
ment opportunities in the medical device sector is complex and
largely absent from the literature (20). Recently Chapman et al.
(12) used a mixed-methods approach to assess the headroom
method’s prognostic ability and usability by developers, which
involved retrospective application of the method to 20 cases,
reporting the sensitivity (92 percent) and negative predictive
value (67 percent) according to subsequent NHS uptake. How-
ever, these numbers failed to characterize the qualitative infor-
mation around research and design opportunities revealed by
the exercise. Further research could investigate the marginal
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benefit of additional modelling at the early stages: a commer-
cial application of value of information analysis. Most valuable
in extending the current literature base would be a study of the
headroom method’s use by developers themselves.
Potential users with whom we have discussed the head-
room method have identified its utility in negotiation with third
parties. For instance, we used an adapted form of the method to
demonstrate the payback of a trial of a new version of a device
to assist the failing heart muscle (21). Moreover, supply-side
methods can inform decisions taken by potential investors, as
when a university department seeks to commercialize a discov-
ery. The availability of a shared, simple, tool to both parties in a
negotiation can have a profound impact. Simplicity allowsmany
options to be explored quickly during, or between negotiations,
while shared information enables both parties to collaborate.
The attraction is perhaps even greater where products are bun-
dled or appear in mixed offerings with services. At a time when
providers and purchasers are in search of new business models
for financial sustainability and are open to profit-sharing and
risk-sharing, the use of headroom merits serious and further
research.
Methodological Issues
One of the interesting issues raised when an inventor tries to
interest an investor is how to arrive at the probability distribu-
tions that provide input data to the model. Work is needed on
“calibrating” expert participants so that elicited distributions
are neither too optimistic nor too pessimistic. As experience
with the use of probabilistic models increases, so increasing
amounts of material will accumulate to inform future elicita-
tions. Because considerable uncertainty is a feature of difficult
decisions in general, the subject of how to make best use of
disparate evidence to make future predictions is a topic that
includes, but extends beyond, commercial economics.
Supply-side models also throw into sharp relief a public
policy issue when both gains and risks are very large. Such a
scenario arises when return on investment covers a very wide
distribution of probabilities such that the probability of gener-
ating a surplus is low but the returns if a surplus is generated
may be massive (as when a scientific investment is of a generic
nature). The question then arises as to how risks and returns
can be distributed to maximize returns to society. In short, the
models we have described to guide commercial decisions may
have applications in industrial policy analysis.
Multi-functional Products
While products used to illustrate this article were fairly typi-
cal of those which are assessed by standard health economics,
situations arise that are trickier, for instance, where the device
has multiple purposes or where its benefits are small but com-
mensurate with low costs per patient. A good example of both
issues is the new generation of devices for genetic sequenc-
ing that can examine for upward of 100 diseases. For a child
with a neurological disorder of unknown cause, there may be a
large number of possible diagnoses but, with rare exceptions, no
specific medical treatment is available. Patients may, however,
benefit from reduced delay in reaching a diagnosis, from simply
being able to glean more information, and from identification of
other family members who are or are not at risk. It is not easy to
capture all possible benefits and harms from such a technology
in QALY-type utility values. A willingness-to-pay method, not
for each item of benefit and harm, but for the test as a whole,
may be a more feasible approach to the valuation of health ben-
efit in such a scenario. The headroom method is easily adapted
to substitute such a measure of benefit for utilities, but we know
of no examples where this has been done.
Value Based Pricing
Health service procurement is increasingly moving from a situ-
ation where the supplier sets a price which the purchaser must
simply decline or accept, to one where the purchaser negotiates
a price based explicitly on health benefit (22;23). This method
of reimbursement has a subtle implication for pricing when
supply-side calculations are made. Under the pricing model
explicated above the company’s optimal nominated price is ac-
companied by a risk that reimbursement will be withheld; this
price will not necessarily be the lowest price that the company
concerned may consider worthwhile. Under a value-based pric-
ing regime the company can obviate the risk by accepting the
price offered, but must forgo any additional revenue that may
have attached to the higher price they might have sought under
the earlier system. Along with the possibility that companies
may have reason to be more (or less) optimistic about the final
price under a negotiated settlement, this suggests that the issue
of pricing be revisited.
It should also be recognized that considerable uncertainty
about the effectiveness and safety of a new device may still
exist at the point at which the company wishes to proceed to
market, invoking the possibility of cost sharing arrangements
whereby further information is collected with a view to price
adjustment. Such arrangements blur the distinction between
supply- and demand-side health economics and raise a complex
set of methodological, policy, and even ethical issues. This is
a topic in urgent need of further scientific study and policy
analysis.
Other Applications
The headroom method has applications beyond devices and
manufactured products to include innovations in service pro-
vision and public health interventions. Here, development fre-
quently takes place in the service itself, rather than “off shore”
in a company or university laboratory. However, the two things
that distinguish economics at the supply side still apply at
the development stage; the possibility of holding an option to
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further develop or amend the innovation pending further data
collection and wide parameter uncertainty at the outset. Appli-
cation of the methods described in this study are thus relevant
to the health economic evaluation of service and public health
interventions at their formative stages and this is topic of on-
going research (24;25). The field would benefit from further
developments inmethods to prioritize technology developments
for these settings.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we have described the progress that has been
made in using a simple method iteratively to improve deci-
sion making within manufacturing businesses. Headroom es-
timates can be used to inform successive business reviews,
thus connecting up a series of decisions that must be made
before a new device can be brought to market. We describe
a pragmatic approach, moving from simple threshold-based
decisions in the early stages, to those that rely on distribu-
tions of probability over future outcomes. Greater use of such
methods and the consistent application by suppliers and their
customers in healthcare provision, would greatly improve the
ability of both sides to ensure value-for-money in the healthcare
market.
Finally, we have suggested some areas where further
methodological development would exploit the progress made
and contribute even more significantly to the technology mar-
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